Recent attacks on the cryptographic hash functions MD4 and MD5 make it clear that strong collision-resistance is a hard-to-achieve goal. We l o o k t o w ards a weaker notion, the universal oneway hash functions UOWHFs of Naor and Yung, and investigate their practical potential. The goal is to build UOWHFs not based on number theoretic assumptions, but from the primitives underlying current cryptographic hash functions like MD5 and SHA-1. Pursuing this goal leads us to new questions. The main one is how to extend a compression function to a full-edged hash function in this new setting. We show that the classic Merkle-Damg ard method used in the standard setting fails for these weaker kinds of hash functions, and we present some new methods that work. Our main construction is the XOR tree." We also consider the problem of input length-variability and present a general solution.
Contents
A cryptographic hash function is a map f which takes a string of arbitrary length and maps it to a string of some xed-length c. The property usually desired of these functions is collision-resistance: it should be hard" to nd distinct strings M and M 0 such that fM = f M .
Cryptographic hash functions are much used, most importantly for digital signatures, and cheap constructions are highly desirable. But in recent y ears we h a v e seen a spate of attacks 10, 11, 12, 13 bring down our most popular constructions, MD4 and MD5 26, 27 . The conclusion is that the design of collision-resistant hash functions may be harder than we had thought.
What can we do? One approach is to design new hash functions. This is being done, with SHA-1 23 and RIPEMD-160 14 being new designs which are more conservative then their predecessors. In this paper we suggest a complementary approach: weaken the goal, and then make do with hash functions meeting this weakened goal. Ask less of a hash function and it is less likely to disappoint! Luckily, a suitable weaker notion already exists: universal one-way hash functions UOWHF, as de ned by Naor and Yung 22 . But existing constructions, based on general or algebraic assumptions 22, 29, 17 , are not too e cient. We take a di erent approach. We integrate the notion with current hashing technology, looking to build UOWHFs out of MD5 and SHA-1 type primitives.
The main technical issue we i n v estigate is how to extend the classic Merkle-Damg ard paradigm 21, 9 to the UOWHF setting. In other words, how to build extended" UOWHFs out of UOW compression functions. We address practical issues like k ey sizes and input-length variability. Our main construction, the XOR tree," also turns out to have applications to reducing key sizes for some existing constructions of UOWHFs. To make for results more directly meaningful to practice we treat security concretely," as opposed to asymptotically.
Unfortunately, the name UOWHFs does not re ect the property of the notion, which i s a w eak form of collision-resistance. We will call our non-asymptotic version target collision-resistance TCR. We refer to the customary notion of collision resistance as any collision-resistance ACR.
Background
Let = f0; 1g be the binary alphabet. Informally, a function f : Msgs ! c on some domain Msgs is a compression function" if Msgs is the set of strings of some small length eg., Msgs = 640 for the compression function of MD5. It is an extended hash function" if Msgs = or at least some big subset of . Either way, a collision for f is a pair M;M 0 2Msgs such that M 6 = M 0 but fM = f M 0 . Still informally, f is said to be any collision-resistant" ACR if it is computationally hard to nd a collision.
The MD method. The Merkle-Damg ard construction 21, 9 takes a function f: c+m ! c and extends it to a function M Df: ! c . Assume for simplicity that M = M 1 M n is a sequence of exactly n blocks, each block of m bits. Fix C 0 2 c . Then compute C i = FC i,1 kM i and set M DfM = C n . Roughly said, the property of this method is that if it is hard to nd collisions in f then it is hard to nd collisions in M Df.
Most of the popular hash functions MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 use the MD construction. Thus the crucial component of each algorithm is the underlying compression function, and we want it to be ACR. But the compression function of MD4 is not: following den Boer and Bosselaers 10 , collisions were found by Dobbertin 12 . Later, collisions were found for the compression function of MD5, again by den Boer and Bosselaers 11 , and in a stronger form by Dobbertin 13 . These attacks are enough to give up on MD4 and MD5 from the point of view of ACR. No collisions have been found for the compression functions of SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160, and these may w ell be stronger. Keying. In the popular hash functions mentioned above there is no explicit key. But Damg ard 8, 9 de nes ACR via keyed functions, and it is in this setting that he proves the MD construction correct 9 . Keying hash functions seems essential for a meaningful formalization of security.
When one treats things carefully, then, a hash function F should not have the signature described above: it must take two arguments| one for the key K and one for the message M. To use F one selects a random key K, publishes it, and from then on you hash according to F K . In essence, the key for F speci es the particular function f = F K which is used to hash strings.
Target Collision-Resistance
With an ACR hash function F the key K is announced and the adversary wins if she manages to nd any collision M;M 0 for f = F K . The points M and M 0 may depend arbitrarily on K; any pair of distinct points will do. In the notion of Naor and Yung 22 the adversary no longer wins by nding just any collision. The adversary must choose one point, say M, in a way which does not depend on K, and then, later, given K, the adversary must nd a second point M 0 this time allowed to depend on K such that M;M 0 is a collision for F K . While it might beeasy to nd a collision M;M 0 in F K by making both M;M 0 depend on K, the adversary may beunable to nd collisions if she is forced to commit" to one point of the collision before seeing K. We call this weakened notion of security target collision-resistance TCR. In the terminology of 22 it is universal one-wayness. Naor and Yung 22 formalize this via the standard polynomial-time adversaries achieve negligible success probability" approach o f asymptotic cryptography. In order to get results which are more directly meaningful for practice, our formalization is non-asymptotic. See Section 2. No birthdays. Besides being a weaker notion and hence easier to achieve we wish to stress one important practical advantage of TCR over ACR: because x must be speci ed before K is known, birthday attacks to nd collisions are not possible. This means the hash length c can besmall, like 64 or 80 bits, as compared to 128 or 160 bits for an ACR hash function. This is important t o us for several reasons and we will appeal to it later. Good enough for signing. In weakening the security requirement on hash functions we might risk reducing their utility. But TCR is strong enough for the major applications, if appropriately used. In particular, it is possible to use TCR hash functions for hashing a message before signing.
See Section 7. The idea is to pick a new key K for each message M and then sign the pair K;F K M, where F is TCR. This works best for short keys. When they are long some extra tricks can be used, as described in Section 7, but we are better o with small keys. Thus there is a strong motivation for keeping keys short.
Making TCR Functions out of Standard Hash Functions
The most convenient w a y to make a TCR hash function is to directly key an existing hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1. We caution that one must becareful in how this keying is done. If not, making a TCR assumption about the keyed function may really be no weaker than making an ACR assumption about the original hash function. See Section 4. give an example of a compression functions which is secure in the TCR sense but for which the resulting hash function is not. Let us clarify one point. Doesn't the function resulting from the MD construction meet even the stronger notion of ACR? The problem is that we are starting from a weaker compression function: our compression function is only TCR. We nd this is not enough to imply that the hash function meets the weaker TCR notion. Linear hash: Basic and XOR. To preserve TCR, the most direct extension we found to the MD construction is to use a di erent k ey at each stage. This works, and its exact security is analyzed in Section 5.2. But the method needs a long key. 1 We provide a variant of the above s c heme which uses only one key for the compression function, but also uses a number of auxiliary keys, which are XORed in at the various stages. This can slightly reduce key sizes, and it also has some advantages from a key-scheduling point of view eg., it may be slow to set up" the key of a compression function, so it's best if this not be changed too often. The basic tree hash. To get major reductions in key size we turn to trees. Wegman and Carter 32 give a tree-based construction of universal hash functions that reduces key sizes, and Naor and Yung have already pointed out that key lengths for UOWHFs can be reduced by the 1 It may b e w orth remarking that the obvious idea for reducing key size is to let the key be a seed to a pseudorandom number generator and specify longer keys by stretching the seed to any desired length. The problem is that our keys are public they are available to the adversary and pseudorandom generators are of no apparent use in such a context. same method 22, Section 2.3 . We recall this basic tree construction in Section 5.4 and provide a concrete analysis of its security. Then we look at key sizes. Suppose we start with a compression function H with key length k mapping dc bits to c bits, and we w ant to hash a L bit message down to m bits. The basic tree construction yields a hash function with a key size of k log d L=c bits.
Key lengths have been reduced, but one can reduce them more. The XOR tree hash. Our main construction is the XOR tree scheme. Here, the hash function uses only one key for the compression function and some auxiliary keys. If we start with a compression function with key length k mapping dc bits to c bits, and we w ant to hash L bits to c bits, the XOR tree construction yields a hash function with a key size of k + dc log d L=c bits.
Here c is short, like 64 bits, since we do not need to worry about birthday attacks for TCR functions. On the other hand, k can be quite large and in many constructions, it is. So the key length for the XOR tree hash will usually bemuch better than the key length for the basic tree hash. Summary. For a summary of the constructions and their key lengths, see Figure 1 .
Other Results
Reducing key sizes for other constructions. Our main motivation has been building TCR hash functions from primitives underlying popular cryptographic hash functions. But XOR trees can also be used to reduce key sizes for TCR hash functions built from combinatorial or algebraic primitives. For example, the subset sum based construction of 17 uses a key of size Ls bits to hash L bits to s bits, where s is a security parameter which controls subset sum instance sizes. Think of s as a few hundred. So the size of the key is even longer than the size of the data.
The basic binary tree scheme can be applied to reduce this: starting with a compression function taking 2s bits to s bits it has key length k = 2s 2 the key size of the resulting hash function is k lgL=s = 2s 2 lgL=s. With our binary XOR tree scheme, the key size of the resulting function is k + 2 s lgL=s = 2 s s + l g L=s. The latter can be quite a bit smaller. For example for s = 300 and a message of length L = 10 KBytes, the key length for the basic tree scheme is about 182 KBytes while that for the XOR trees scheme is about 23 KBytes, so that the gain is a factor of about 8. Domains and collision lengths. Strings to be hashed may be of virtually any length at all. Nonetheless, it is often convenient to think of messages as having lengths which are multiples of some xed block size, like 512. This restriction can beremoved using simple padding techniques. For example, append to each message a 1" bit and then the minimal number of 0" bits so that the padded message is in the domain of the hash function. This method, and many others, provably preserve TCR, and ACR, too. For details, see Section 6.
Our proofs of security will rule out adversaries who can nd collisions for equal-length strings M;M 0 .In practice, collisions between strings of unequal length have to be prevented, too. To handle this we again provide a general construction. But this time the standard padding techniques do not necessarily work. We give a method that does. It turns a hash function secure against equallength strings M;M 0 2Msgs into a hash function secure against collisions of arbitrary strings shortMsg; longMsg 2 Msgs. The method requires just one extra application of the compression function. See Section 6. It is the above t w o results which e ectively justify our restricting our attention to hash functions that resist equal-length collisions for some set of convenient input lengths.
Related Work
We have already described the most closely related work, which is due to Naor and Yung 22 , Merkle 21 , and Damg ard 8, 9 .
The general approach to concrete, quantitative security that we are following began with 3 . A good deal of work has gone into keying hash functions for message authentication 1, 30, 19, 24 . In particular, HMAC is a popular solution to this problem 1, 20 . The di erence is that in the message authentication setting, parties share a secret key, which is used to key the hash function; in our setting, there are no secret keys, and the hash function is to be keyed with a key that, although chosen at random, is eventually available to the adversary.
Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk 2 considered keyed compression functions as pseudorandom functions, and showed that applying the MD construction then yields a pseudorandom function. Again, the di erence is that the notion of pseudorandomness relies on the secrecy of the key.
A w eaker-than-standard notion of hashing is considered in 1 . However their notion is based on a hidden key and hash functions meeting their notion, although useful in the message authentication setting, don't su ce for digital signatures, where the computation of the hash function must be public to enable signature veri cation.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared as 4 . This is the full version. We say that f : Msgs ! is length consistent if jfMj = jfM 0 j whenever jMj = jM 0 j. A family of hash functions F is length consistent i f j F K M j = j F K 0 M 0 j whenever jMj = jM 0 j and jKj = jK 0 j.
Collisions. Recall a collision for a function f de ned on a domain Msgs is a pair of strings M;M 0 2Msgs such that M 6 = M 0 but fM = f M 0 . In our setting the function of interest will bef =F K for a randomly chosen key K. Security of a hash family talks about the di culty of nding collisions in F K . There are two notions of security. We will de ne both below. First some technicalities. Programs and timing. We x some RAM random access machine model of computation, including pointers, as in any algorithms text eg. 6 , and we measure execution time of a program with respect to that model. An adversary is a program for our model, written in some xed programming language. Any program is allowed randomness: the programming language supports a log n-time operation FlipCoinn which returns a random number between 1 and n. By convention, when we speak of the running time of an adversary we mean the actual execution time in the xed model of computation, plus the length of the description of the program. This prevents, for example, the possibility of declaring very e cient a program that stores in its code a 
Any Collision-Resistance | ACR
The standard" notion of collision resistance for a function f is that given f it is hard to nd a an M;M 0 for f. In the keyed setting, it can be formalized like this cf. 8, 9 . An adversary CF, called a collision-nder, is given K chosen at random from k and is said to succeed if it outputs a collision M;M 0 for F K . We measure the quality of a hash function by seeing how successful an adversary can be when compared against the adversary's resource expenditure. Formally, a collision-nder CF is said to t; ; -break the family of hash functions F : k Msgs ! k if the running time of the adversary is at most t, strings M;M 0 that CF outputs have length at most , and the probability that CF, on input K, outputs a collision M;M 0 for F K is at least . Here the probability is take o v er K a random point i n k and CF's random coins.
Note that the adversary is given the random point K the key is announced" and only then is the adversary asked to nd a collisions for F K . So the adversary may employ a strategy in which the collision which is found depends on K. This makes the notion very strong.
Often we don't care about the length of the collisions that an adversary may nd. In this case we omit from the notation above.
Informally, w e s a y that F is any collision-resistant" ACR if for every collision-nder who t; -breaks F, the ratio t= is large.
Target Collision-Resistance | TCR
In the notion of 22 the adversary does not get credit for nding any old collision. The adversary must still nd a collision M;M 0 ,but now M is not allowed to depend on the key: the adversary must choose it before the key K is known. Only after committing" to M does the adversary get K. Then it must nd M 0 .
Formally, the adversary CF = CF-I; CF-II called a target collision nder consists of two algorithms, CF-I and CF-II. First, CF-I is run, to produce M and possibly some extra state information," State, that CF-I wants to pass to CF-II. We call M the target message. Now, a random key K is chosen and CF-II is run. Algorithm CF-II is given K;M;State and must nd M 0 di erent from M such that F K M = F K M 0 . We call M 0 the sibling message. The sibling message can depend on the key, but the target message can not.
The formalization of 22 was asymptotic. Here we provide a concrete one, and call this version of the notion target collision-resistance TCR.
We begin with some special cases. A target collision nder CF = CF-I; CF-II is called an equallength target collision nder if the messages M;M 0 which CF-I outputs always satisfy jMj = jM 0 j.
It is called a variable-length target collision nder when no such restriction is made on the relative lengths of M;M 0 . Let CF = CF-I; CF-II be a target-collision nder. We say that it t; ; -breaks F if its running time is at most t, the strings M;M 0 output by CF are of length at most , and CF nds a collision with probability at least . The running time is the sum of the running times for CF-I and CF-II, and the probability i s o v er the coins of CF and the choice of K. We say that F is t; ; -resistant to equal-length target collisions if there is no equal-length target collision nder which t; ; -breaks F. We say that F is t; ; -resistant to variable-length target collisions if there is no variable-length target collision nder which t; ; -breaks F. If we s a y that F is t; ; -TCR, or t; ; -resistant to target collisions, we mean it is t; ; -resistant to variable-length target collisions.
We will sometimes write ProbSuccessCF; F to denote the probability that CF nds a collision in F.
Often we don't care about the length of the collisions that an adversary may nd. In this case we omit from the notations above.
Informally, w e say F is target collision-resistant" TCR or, resp., TCR to equal-length collisions if it for every resp., equal-length target collision-nder who t; -breaks F, the ratio t= is large.
Remark 2.1 Notice that we do not restrict the adversary to any particular attack strategy. If a family of hash functions meets this notion of security, then it is secure against all attacks that can be run given the prescribed resources. This is the advantage of the provable security" approach.
Remark 2.2 Resistance to equal-length target collisions is a weaker notion than resistance to variable-length target collisions: in the former, the adversary is only being given credit if it nds collisions where the messages are of the same length. In practice, we want resistance to variablelength target resistance. However, it turns out the convenient design approach is to focus on resistance to equal-length target collisions and then achieve resistance to variable-length target collisions via a general transformations we present in Section 6. Remark 2.3 Consider the following alternative syntax for a target collision-nder: it is an algorithm B together with a string M. The associated notion for target collision-resistance is that B;M i s successful in attacking F if, on input K, algorithm B outputs an M 0 such that M 0 6 = M and F K M = F K M 0 . This de nition is in some ways simpler than our nd-target nd-sibling" notion, since there is only one algorithm involved and, consequently, w e h a v e no state information to communicate from one algorithm to another.
The two notions are actually equivalent. Certainly the alternative notion is not stronger: given B;M, we could have constructed CF = CF-I; CF-II where CF-I outputs M;where is the empty string and CF-II behaves like B. To see that the alternative notion is not weaker, start with a collision nder CF = CF-I; CF-II. Consider the random coins that cause CF-I to maximize the probability that CF will succeed. For these random coins there is a resulting M;State which CF-I will output. Construct a M;B using this message M and letting B be the algorithm which behaves like CF-II started in the state indicated by State. The success probability o f B will be at least the success probability o f CF.
Why did we select our nd-target nd-sibling" formalization instead of the alternative one? First, the nd-target nd-sibling formalization more directly mirrors our intuition, re ecting the observation that, in the real world, there is computation associated to nding the target message. Second, if one considers a parameterized collection of hash families, a di erent family for each k ey length k, then our nd-target nd-sibling notion immediately generalizes to give a proper, uniform notion for security for such objects. This is not true for the alternative notion.
Composition Lemmas
It is useful to hash a long string in stages, rst cutting down its length via one hash function, then applying another to this output to cut it down further. Naor and Yung 22 considered this kind of composition in the context of TCR hash functions. We rst state a concrete version of their lemma and then extend it to an equal-length collision analogue which is in fact what we will use. In this paper we also need such a lemma for the case of equal-length TCR. This requires an extra condition on the rst family of hash functions, namely that it be length consistent. See Appendix A for the proof. Lemma 3.2 TCR composition lemma for equal-length collisions Let 
TCR Hash Functions from Standard Hash Functions
The most direct way to construct a TCR hash function is to key a function like MD5 or SHA-1. We point out the importance of doing this keying with care. Figure 2 : Construction MDH | The Merkle-Damg ard construction with a common key K. It is possible for H to be TCR and yet MDH might fail to be.
Suppose, for example, that one keys MD5 through its 128-bit initial chaining value, IV. Denote the resulting hash function family by MD5 . Then breaking MD5 in the sense of violating TCR amounts to nding collisions in an algorithm which is identical to MD5 except that it begins with a random, known IV as opposed to the published one. It seems unlikely that this task would be harder than nding collisions in MD5 itself. It could even be easier! Alternatively, suppose one tries to use the well-known envelope" method, setting MD5 K M = MD5KkMkK. It seems likely that any extension of Dobbertin's attack 13 which nds collisions in MD5 would also defeat MD5 . Letting md5 denote the compression function of MD5, note that Note that the approach a b o v e shu ing key bits in with and message bits is equally at home in de ning a TCR compression function based on the compression function underlying a map like MD5 or SHA-1. The resulting keyed compression function can then beextended to an extended keyed hash function using the constructs of this paper. Doing this one will gain in provable-security but lose out in increased key length.
TCR Hashing based on TCR Compression Functions
Throughout this section messages will beviewed as sequences of blocks each of which has some xed length of m bits. For notational simplicity, let m = m bethe space of possible message blocks. A message is then regarded as M = M 1 M n where M i 2 m for each i = 1 ; : : : ; n . The numberofm-bit blocks in such a message M is denoted by n = jMj m . Typically N will stand for some maximum number of allowed blocks, so that n N.
We are given a TCR compression function H. We wish to build an extended function H 0 . We begin by looking at the method used in the ACR setting. Damg ard 9 shows that if H is ACR then so is M DH n . It would benice if this worked for TCR too. But it does not. The reason is a little subtle. If H is TCR it still might be easy to nd collisions in H K if we knew K in advance meaning we w ere allowed to see K before specifying any point for the collision. However, a few MD iterations of H on a xed point can e ectively surface the key K, causing subsequent iterations to misbehave.
This intuition above can be formalized by giving an example of a compression function H which is TCR but for which M DH n is not. To give such an example we must rst assume that some TCR compression function exists else the question is moot. Calling this F, we construct H so that H is still TCR, but M DH n is not TCR, for some integer n. The proposition below gives the exact bounds with which H, on the one hand, inherits the TCRness of F, and, on the other hand, M DH n can be broken. So M;M 0 is a collision for M DH 2 , meaning the latter is not TCR. Now w e need to check that H, h o w ever, was TCR. We claim this is true because by assumption F is TCR. The intuition is that as long as y 6 = K, the rst block of the output of H is just the output of F and so one can't nd collisions here. But since the target message must bespeci ed before seeing K, the adversary has only a 2 ,k chance of having y = K in the target message x k y k z. One might criticize the example above for being somewhat arti cial." But recall the goal is to nd general constructions that work for any compression function. What the above shows is that this hope is lost for the standard MD construction.
Remark 5.2 There is a possible source of confusion on the subject of how a concrete hash function like MD5 can be seen as an application of the MD construction. In functions like MD5 there is no explicit key, so the relationship is not so obvious. There is, however, a compression function, call it md5, and one often thinks of this compression function as taking two arguments: a 128-bit chaining value, C, and the 512-bit message block, M. From that one might assume that md5C;M is the concrete realization of a family of hash functions H C M. But what happens in MD5 would then becompletely di erent from what Damg ard de ned| and rightly so, since it is easy to see that chaining H C M as it is done in MD5 would not preserve collision resistance in the sense of ACR or TCR. Instead, the proper viewpoint for seeing MD5 as an instance of the MD-construction is to think of the input message to md5 as the entire 640-bits, so that H K CkM = md5CkM. Thus md5 corresponds to H K . What, then, is K? In essence, it is unpredictable choices that were involved in deciding on the md5 algorithm itself| Rivest choose the key K and that key is md5.
Only under this viewpoint are the MD4-family of hash functions instances of the Merkle Damg ard construction.
The Basic Linear Hash
Given that the MD construction doesn't propagate TCR, a natural approach is to iterate just as in M DH n but with a di erent k ey at each round. We will show that this does preserve TCR. We m ust now bound the probability that x; x 0 is a collision for HK; in the experiment describing the attack o f CF 0 on H. Notice that the distribution on the keys K 1 ; : : : ; K N is uniform remember K =K i too is chosen at random in the experiment and so CF nds a collision with probability ProbSuccessCF; LH N . The distribution of the keys is also independent of i, and the latter was chosen at random, so if M;M 0 is a collision for LH N K 1 : : : K N ; then we h a v e i = j where j is the value of Equation 1 with probability 1 =n 1=N. So 0 = N .
The running time of CF 0 is that of CF plus the overhead. This overhead is N m + T H + k + c . The choice of t in the theorem statement makes all this at most t 0 , from which we conclude the result. Figure 4 : Construction XLH | The XOR linear scheme. Compared to LH , the key size may be reduced. But it is still long.
Remark 5.4 We emphasize that, with the above theorem, when the key K is given to the adversary following the adversary's identifying the target collision M = M 1 M n , it is the entire key K = K 1 K N which i s g i v en to the adversary, and not just the pre x of it K 1 K n . This makes the result stronger. Subsequent theorems will be the same.
The XOR Linear Hash
We present a v ariant of the above in which the compression function uses the same key K in each iteration, but an auxiliary mask" key K i , depending on the iteration numberi,is XORed to the chaining variable in the i-th iteration. One advantage is that the key size is reduced compared to the basic scheme for some choices of the parameters, namely when c k . Another advantage is in key scheduling. If the compression function is being computed in hardware it may be preferable to x the key for the compression function. In software too there can be a penalty for key setup."
More precisely, to hash M = M 1 : : : M n 2 n m n N w e use one key K 2 k for the compression function and auxiliary keys K 1 ; : : : ; K n 2 c , as follows. As usual IV = 0 c . Algorithm X LHK K 1 : : : K n ; M C 0 IV for i = 1 ; : : : ; n do D i,1 K i C i,1 C i HK;D i,1 kM i return C n This is depicted in Figure 4 . The family of hash functions X LH N : k+N c N m ! c is de ned by letting X LH N K K 1 : : : K N ; M = X LHK K 1 : : : K n ; M where n = jMj m , for every K 2 k , every K 1 ; : : : ; K N 2 c , and every M 2 N m . For notational convenience we de ne X LHK; = 0 c and notice that for all n 1 X LHK K 1 : : : K n ; M 1 : : : M n =H K K n X LHK K 1 : : : K n , 1 ; M 1 : : : M n , 1 k M n :
The following theorem says that if the compression function H is resistant to target collisions then so is the extended hash function X LH N . Given this the probability that x; y is a collision for HK; can becomputed as in the proof of Theorem 5.3, based on Equation 2, and the bound on the running time can be made similarly.
The Basic Tree Hash
A tree can be used to reduce the key size. We are slightly more general than 22 , considering d-ary trees for d 2, and also allowing the message to behashed to have a numberofblocks less than the maximum, as opposed to mandating that all messages have the maximum number of blocks.
We start with a compression function H: k dc ! c . We rst describe a primitive w e will use. With probability 1 =n 1=N we h a v e i = j . So the probability that x; x 0 is a collision for HK;
is at least =N. In the basic tree hash we k ey the compression function anew at each level of the tree. Thus the key length to hash an nc-bit message is k log d n, which can be large, because k may belarge. In the XOR variant there is one key K de ning HK; and this is used at all levels. However, there are auxiliary keys K 1 ; : : : ; K d , one per level. These are not keys for the compression function: they are just XORed to the data at each stage. As described in Section 5.2, the motivation is that we can get shorter keys this happens when dc k and also better key scheduling. Figure 6 : Construction XTH | The XOR tree scheme, illustrated for m = 3 a n d = 3 . Notice that H is always keyed with K, while an auxiliary key, di ering for each level, is XORed just before the application of H K .
K
Speci cally, to hash a message M 2 d l c l ` we use one key K 2 k for the compression function this is called the primary key and auxiliary keys K 1 ; : : : ; K l 2 dc . Before describing the algorithm we need some notation. Namely for a string X and integer j 1 let X j = X k k X | z j denote the string formed by concatenating j copies of X. 8 We will use this later.
We can no longer appeal to the composition lemma in proving security, because the di erent parallel hashes use a common key K. Instead we give a direct proof of security. The target message nding algorithm CF-I is very simple: it just outputs some random string x of length dc. The sibling nder CF-II begins by letting M be the target message output by CF-I. It then picks a tree level r 2 f 1 ; : : : ; l g at random. Recall that at level r we have d l,r nodes. We group them into groups of size d, so that we view them as forming a set of d l,r,1 strings, each dc bits long. After XORing each of these with K r we get the inputs to the compression function for this stage. Our goal is to make x one of these inputs, namely x should be K r XORed with one of the groups at level r. The key idea is that K r will be chosen as a function of x to make this happen.
How? CF-II 0 picks j 2 f1; : : : ; d l , r g at random and sets z;K r as indicated in the code. Notice that since x was chosen randomly and independently of anything else, the keys K 1 ; : : : ; K are all random and independent of each other. Now CF-II 0 gives key K K 1 K to CF-II, along with State as state information. CF-II outputs a message M 0 . We know that jMj = jM 0 j. Also, if we are lucky, M;M 0 is a collision for X T H d l K K 1 K ; , and we proceed under this assumption.
CF-II 0 computes, for this message, the value at the same node as before, namely x 0 , and outputs this.
We m ust now bound the probability that x; x 0 is a collision for HK;. We use Equation 9. The number of possibilities for ; is at most d 0 + + d , 1 = d , 1=d ,1. Since r; j w ere chosen at random we h a v e probability at least d , 1=d`, 1 that r; j = ; . So the probability that x; x 0 is a collision for HK; i s 0 d , 1=d`, 1 d , 1=N , 1. The time bounds can be veri ed by looking at the pseudocode.
Message Lengths
The constructions and results in Section 5 make t w o restrictions we will now indicate how to remove. First, we proved security against equal-length target collisions. In practice one requires security against variable-length target collisions. Second, we assumed message lengths are multiples of some xed number, like a block size, or eve n a p o w er of some xed number, like in the tree schemes. In reality a n y length should be allowed.
We begin by showing how to extend a TCR hash function secure against equal-length collisions into a TCR hash function secure against variable-length collisions. Then we will see how to handle strings of any length.
Length Variability
Suppose we h a v e a hash function secure against equal-length collisions. We w ant to address inputlength variability, meaning make it secure against variable-length collisions.
It is often assumed that input-length variability can be handled by padding the nal block o f a message M to be hashed so that it unambiguously encodes jMj. Here, instead, is a general technique to achieve input-length variability. Namely, we rst hash the message using one key. Then we concatenate the message length to the result, and hash again, using a second key. The second hashing typically requires just one extra application of the compression function, since we are hashing a small, xed length message. If the hash functions used are secure against equal-length target collisions, the result is secure against variable-length target collisions.
See Petrank and Racko 18 for a related way to address length variability in another context, namely the CBC MAC. It remains to bound the running times. That of CF 1 is t + k 2 and this is at most t 1 for the choice of t in the lemma statement. That of CF 2 is t + k 2 + 2 T H 1 + 2 m which b y the choice of t 2 in the lemma statement is at most t 2 .
While length-indicating padding doesn't work in general, does it work for the schemes of Section 5?
For LH the answer is no: starting with an arbitrary TCR compression function H 0 one can construct a TCR compression function H for which LH pad is insecure against variable-length target collisions. For X LH the answer is yes: if H is a TCR compression function then X LH pad is guaranteed to be secure against target collisions; one can appropriately modify the proof of Theorem 5.5 to show this. We did not investigate the analogous questions for TH and X T H .
Padding
Combining the methods of Sections 5 and 6.1 we h a v e constructions for TCR hash functions which are secure against variable-length collisions on a domain that has gaps"| our domains only include strings that have length a multiple of some block length, or even, in the case of the tree schemes, a power of some integer d. To wrap things up we must eliminate the restriction that lengths are of some particular values. Simple padding schemes work ne. This is shown by the following result. When signing as above there are actually two unrelated reasons for using the hash function h.
The rst reason is to map the in nite or enormous space MSGS of strings that we m a y wish to sign down to the small space Msgs of strings that our primitive knows how to handle. For example, one might h a v e Msgs 1024 if one is using SignRSA. The second reason for applying h is to help mask algebraic structure in the underlying cryptographic primitive. In particular, SignRSA does not, by itself, have the properties one expects of a secure signature scheme, due to its algebraic structure| and yet SignRSA h seems to be a good way to sign when the hash function h is chosen well.
In the current w ork we are only concerned with reducing lengths, not in covering up algebraic properties of the underlying primitive. Thus we will assume that we already have in hand a secure signature scheme. Examples of such s c hemes are 5, 15, 7 . The rst requires ideal hash functions, aka random oracles, in addition to the assumption that RSA is one-way, while the second and third require only the assumption that RSA is one-way, but are less e cient. There are also, of course, many more schemes, but these are less e cient still. We imagine that the only problem with Sign is its small domain, Msgs, and we simply want to enlarge the domain to make a function Sign which can sign messages on all of MSGS. The domain should be either MSGS = or MSGS = for some enormous number`.
It is a folklore result that if h : MSGS ! c is a randomly selected hash function from an ACR family of hash functions, and if Sign is a secure signing function with domain c , then SIGN = Sign h provides a secure way to sign messages on the domain MSGS.
Here we extend the above approach to use TCR hash function. First we will need some basic de nitions on signatures and their security. Syntax of signature schemes. A digital signature scheme, Gen; Sign; Verify, consists of a key generation algorithm, a signing algorithm, and a verifying algorithm. The rst of these algorithms will always beprobabilistic; the second algorithm might or might not be; the third algorithm is always deterministic. A digital signature scheme has an associated message space, Msgs A forgery nder FF takes as input a public key pk, and FF tries to forge a signature with respect to pk. To do this it is allowed a chosen message attack. This means that FF can request and obtain signatures of any messages it wants. This is modeled by providing FF with oracle access to the signing algorithm. The forgery nder is deemed successful if it outputs a valid forgery| a message signature pair M;s such that Verify pk M;s =1and yet M was not a message of which a signature was requested of the signing oracle. The forgery nder FF is said to be a t; q; -forgery nder if its running time including the description size of FF, as perour conventions is at most t, and FF makes at mostueries of its signing oracle, and the length of these queries, as well as the length of the strings M;s output by FF, is at most . Such a forgery nder FF is said to t; q; ; -break the signature scheme if the probability that FF outputs a valid forgery is at least . The probability i s o v er the random choices of FF as well as the random choices of Gen and Sign. We say that the signature scheme is t; q; ; -secure if there is no forgery nder FF which t; q; ; -breaks it.
Signing with an TCR hash family | Basic method. Let Gen; Sign; Verify be a signature scheme having associated message space Msgs. We want to extend this to a signature scheme GEN ; SIGN ; VERIFY with an associated larger message space MSGS. We desire a method with the simplicity o f SIGN = Sign h, y et we w ant t o a v oid the use of an ACR hash family.
Assuming that c Msgs for some constant c, one might rst try letting H be TCR and using the same scheme sketched above. Namely, x a random key K 2 k , let h = H K , and sign M by s R Sign sk hM. The key K is a public constant associated to the signature scheme. This approach w orks for H : k MSGS ! c being ACR but it does not work for H being TCR. The reason is simple: in an adaptive c hosen message attack the adversary, knowing K, m a y be able to nd two messages, M and M 0 , which collide under H K . If so, the adversary asks the signing oracle for the signature of M and from this the adversary immediately knows a valid forgery for M 0 .
Instead, the signing algorithm can choose K anew for each message. The key K is included with the signature; it is not secret. We h a v e to adjust slightly the domain Msgs; n o w w e need that k+c Msgs. Here, formally, is the signature scheme. It is pictured in Figure 7 runs an environment identical to that corresponding to Equation 11 . From this and the de nition of event E 1 , the probability that succeeds in forgery is at least p 1 . The time t 1 which requires is at most t 1 = t + q + 1 T H; +Ok+c. The number of queries q 1 made by is precisely q 1 = q. Queries asked by are of length c + k, while the strings output by have length at most + k.
Consulting the bounds for t, q and in the theorem statement w e conclude that p 1 From this and the de nition of event E 2 , the probability that CF nds a collision must be at least p 2 =q. This is because every time that FF forges with a pair of points M; K;s and M 0 ; K;s where H K M = H K M 0 there is a 1=q chance that the key K given as input to CF-II was the key with respect to which the forgery was accomplished. The time t 2 which CF requires is at most t 1 = t + q + 1 T H; +T Gen + qT Sign k + c + O k + c . Consulting the bounds for t in the theorem statement w e conclude that p 2 =q 2 .
Putting our results together we h a v e that p 1 + p 2 1 + q 2 for the given t; q; .
Handling long keys. One potential di culty in using the above approach is that the signature primitive Sign might have a domain Msgs too small to accommodate the hash of message M together with the entire hash key K. This could happen if hash keys are quite long. When using an ad. hoc. construction of the sort discussed in Section 4 this will not be a problem, for such cases the key length will besmall and independent of the message length. But suppose we are using XOR trees, for example. Then the length of the key grows logarithmically with m = jMj. If M is long then jKj might get too big to t along with C in the scope of Sign. To handle this possibility w e can hash multiple times. Suppose we start with a long message M, where m = jMj. Use Figure 8 .
What about the e ciency? Things are quite reasonable. We use only one application of Sign and some hashing, regardless of message length. The concern may be that we transmit more data since we have to send both the keys K 1 ; K 2 . But K 1 is much shorter than M and K 2 is much shorter than K 1 , s o i f w e are already sending M, the overhead in additional bits is not signi cant.
Of course one may use more than two iterations. In general, we hash as often as necessary to bring the nal key size down to a small enough value that the nal key can t in the scope of the given signature function. Using a scheme like XOR trees, the reduction in key sizes proceeds exponentially, so that only Olog m iterations are needed to hash a string of length m. In practice, this is bounded by a small constant. Signing with a TCR hash function using multiple levels of hashing. The technique is useful when key sizes grow with the message lengths, and message may be long.
